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Trustees of the UNITED PRECISION MACHINE ENGINEERING
COMPANY PROFIT SHARING TRUST

B.

ABCO INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., a Utah Corporation
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JOSEPH L. HENROID, Trustee for the ANNETTE JACOBS TRUST
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ALETHA DEWSNUP

E.

T. LAMAR DEWSNUP
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ARROW INVESTMENT CO., a limited partnership
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THE FEDERAL LAND BANK OF BERKELEY, IMPERIAL LAND TITLE,
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as beneficiaries

H.
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I.

MINERAL FERTILIZER CO., INC.
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HARRY V. KAPS

The parties listed in F through J were defendants in the
original complaint but are not parties to this appeal.
Party E (T. LaMar Dewsnup) is now deceased.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution,
Section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated (1996), and Rules
3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESERVED FOR APPEAL AND PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues have been preserved for appeal and are
presented for review:
Issue #1;

Did the trial court err in determining that on

December 5, 1980, there was $5,000 in costs and attorney fees due
and owing on the Promissory Notes?

This issue was preserved for

appeal at the evidentiary hearings on attorney fees held on
September 8, 2000 and November 13, 2000.
Issue #2:

(R. at 936-37.)

Did the trial court err in determining that on

April 29, 1994, there were $88,911.67 in costs and attorney fees
secured by the Trust .Deed?

This issue was preserved for appeal

at the evidentiary hearings on attorney fees held on September 8,
2000 and November 13, 2000.
Issue #3:

(R. at 936-37.)

Did the trial court err in denying Defendants'

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment?

This issue was preserved

for appeal in Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and

1

Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment.
Issue #4:

(R. at 445-51, 452-68.)

Did the trial court err in granting Plaintiffs'

Motion for Summary Judgment?

This issue was preserved for appeal

in Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment.

(R. at 445-51, 452-68.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Issue #1:

A determination of whether $5,000 in costs and

attorney fees were owing on the Promissory Notes on December 5,
1980, involves a question of law, which this Court reviews for
correction while affording no deference to the trial court.

See

Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, %6, 983 P.2d 575
("Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law.
Thus, we accord the trial court's legal conclusions regarding the
contract no deference and review them for correctness."
(Citations omitted)); see also Equitable Life & Cas. & Ins. Co.
v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("In Utah,
attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by statute or
contract.

If provided for by contract, attorney fees are awarded

in accordance with the terms of that contract."
omitted)).

(Citations

In addition, the trial court's findings of fact as to

the amount of attorney fees owed by the Dewsnups will be set
2

aside if they are "clearly erroneous."
Issue #2:

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

A determination of whether $88,911.67 in costs

and attorney fees were secured by the Trust Deed on April 29,
1994, involves a question of law, which this Court reviews for
correction while affording no deference to the trial court.

See

Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, f6, 983 P.2d 575
("Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law.
Thus, we accord the trial court's legal conclusions regarding the
contract no deference and review them for correctness."
(Citations omitted)); see also Equitable Life & Cas. & Ins. Co.
v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (uIn Utah,
attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by statute or
contract.

If provided for by contract, attorney fees are awarded

in accordance with the terms of that contract."
omitted)).

(Citations

In addition, the trial court's findings of fact as to

the amount of attorney fees secured by the Trust Deed will be set
aside if they are "clearly erroneous."
Issue #3:

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

A determination of whether the trial court erred

in denying Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
involves a question of law, which this Court reviews for
correction and accords no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions.

See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Utah Coal &

Lumber Rest., Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 UT 100,
3

1(9, 43 5 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 ("We review a trial court's summary
judgment ruling for correctness and afford no deference to its
legal conclusions."

(Citations omitted)).

Further, when

reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a party's
motion for summary judgment,

xxx

[this Court] accept [s] the facts

and inferences in the light most favorable to the [losing]
party.'"

SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback &

Assocs. , 2001 UT 54, 1(9, 28 P.3d 669 (quoting Winegar v. Froerer
Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991)).
Issue #4:

A determination of whether the trial court erred

in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment involves a
question of law, which this Court reviews for correction and
accords no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.

See

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Utah Coal & Lumber Rest., Inc. v.
Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, %S, 435 Utah Adv. Rep.
14 ("We review a trial court's summary judgment ruling for
correctness and afford no deference to its legal conclusions."
(Citations omitted)).

Further, when reviewing a trial court's

decision to grant or deny a party's motion for summary judgment,
"x[this Court] accept [s] the facts and inferences in the light
most favorable to the [losing] party.'"

SME Indus., Inc. v.

Thompson, Ventulett, 'Stainback & Assocs., 2001 UT 54, %9, 28 P.3d
669 (quoting Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah
4

1991)) .
STATEMENT OF CASE
This case is before this Court for the fourth time.

See

Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993) (Timm I); Timm v.
Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996) (Timm II); Timm v. Dewsnup,
1999 UT 105, 990 P.2d 942 (Timm III).
In 1978, Defendants Aletha Dewsnup and her late husband, T.
LaMar Dewsnup, (collectively, the Dewsnups), borrowed $119,000
for a two-year period to purchase a motel.

The Dewsnups executed

three promissory notes (Promissory Notes) totaling $119,000.

In

addition, the Dewsnups executed a trust deed and amended trust
deed (collectively, the Trust Deed) in favor of Plaintiffs
against the Dewsnups' 160-acre farm and 56.71 acres of land in
Oak City, Utah (collectively, the Trust Deed Property).1

On June

1, 1980, the balance of the debt came due and was not timely
paid.

By December 5, 1980, all the principal and interest due on

the Promissory Notes was paid in full.
On June 7, 1980, Plaintiffs advanced $49,966.21 on the
Dewsnups' behalf under an "Assignment of Contract."

The

Assignment of Contract obligated the Dewsnups to reimburse
x

The Dewsnups also executed a document entitled "Assignment
of Contract" assigning to Plaintiffs the Dewsnups' interest in a
real estate purchase contract, and a document entitled "Security
Agreement" securing the loan with certain water rights owned by
the Dewsnups.
5

Plaintiffs for the advance.

That debt, however, was not secured

by the Trust Deed.
After all principal and interest due on the Promissory Notes
had been paid in full, Plaintiffs continued to pursue the
Dewsnups for collection of the $49,966.21 advance.

On April 29,

1994, Plaintiffs foreclosed on the Trust Deed for the $49,966.21
(together with interest thereon in the amount of $116,869,35),
plus $50,5 30.76 in attorney fees (together with interest thereon
in the amount of $5,488.30).
In Timm (III), this Court held that the $49,966.21 debt was
not secured by the Trust Deed and remanded for a determination of
the costs and attorney fees due under the Promissory Notes at the
time principal and interest on the Promissory Notes was paid in
full (December 5, 1980) and at the time of the foreclosure sale
(April 29, 1994).

1999 UT 105, Hl5, 990 P.2d 942.

In so doing,

this Court stated as follows:
We . . . remand this case to the trial court
to determine what amount, if any, of attorney
fees remained unpaid on the promissory notes
when the sale was held. It was only for that
cimount that the foreclosure sale could have
legally been held. For all amounts in excess
of that amount, the sale was defective.
Because any excess debt owing by Dewsnup was
not secured by the trust deed property, it
follows that the trial court erred in
dismissing Dewsnup's counterclaim for
wrongful foreclosure.

6

Id.
On remand, the trial court found that Plaintiffs had
incurred $5,000 in costs in attorney fees in collecting the
Promissory Notes at the time the Promissory Notes were paid in
full (December 5, 1980) and that $88,911.67 in costs and attorney
fees were secured by -the Trust Deed at the time of the
foreclosure sale (April 29, 1994).
Addendum A, attached hereto.

(R. at 779-84); see also

After the trial court entered its

findings, both the Dewsnups and Plaintiffs filed for summary
judgment.

(R. at 788-90; 832-48; 849-51).

The Dewsnups' Motion

for Summary Judgment alleged that the foreclosure sale was
defective because it (1) was barred by the statute of
limitations, (2) foreclosed on an unsecured debt, (3) violated
the one-action rule, and (4) failed to comply with the statutory
requirements for a foreclosure sale.

(R. at 834-48).

The trial

court denied the Dewsnups' motion and granted Plaintiffs' motion.
(R. at 925-27) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On June 1, 1978, the Dewsnup executed the Promissory

Notes totaling $119,000 in favor of Plaintiffs.
2.

(R. at 465.)

On June 1, 1978, the Dewsnups also executed the Trust

Deed to secure repayment of the Promissory Notes.

The Trust Deed

granted Plaintiffs a security interest in the Trust Deed
7

Property.
3.

(R. at 464-65.)
As additional security for repayment of the Promissory

Notes, the Dewsnups also executed an Assignment of Contract (the
"Assignment of Contract") and a Security Agreement (the "Security
Agreement").

The Assignment of Contract assigned to Plaintiffs a

security interest in a real estate purchase contract (the "Arrow
Purchase Contract") through which the Dewsnups were purchasing
additional farm land (the "Arrow Property") from Arrow Investment
Company.

The Security Agreement granted Plaintiffs a security

interest in certain "Conk irrigation water rights."
4.

On June 1, 1980, the Promissory Notes came due and the

Dewsnups failed to pay off the loan at that time.
5.

(R. at 464.)

(R. at 464.)

By June 1, 1980, the Dewsnups had also failed to pay

the 1979 property taxes on the Arrow Property and had failed to
make the January 2, 1980 annual installment payment on the Arrow
Purchase Contract.
6.

(R. at 464.)

The Assignment of Contract provided that Plaintiffs

could make the Dewsnups' payments under the Arrow Purchase
Contract and then require the Dewsnups to reimburse Plaintiffs
for those payments, to wit:
[The Dewsnups] agree that in the event they
are in default [under the Arrow Purchase
Contract] that [Plaintiffs] may make payments
due under and pursuant to [the Arrow Purchase
Contract] and will be reimbursed for the same
8

by [the Dewsnups].
(R. at 463-64.)
7.

On June 2, 1980, Plaintiffs paid on behalf of the

Dewsnups the January 2, 1980 Arrow Purchase Contract payment in
the amount of $47,880.50, and paid the delinquent 1979 property
taxes owing on the Arrow Property in the amount of $2085.71
(collectively, the "$49,966.21 advance").
8.

(R. at 463.)

On September 16, 1980, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint

seeking judgment against the Dewsnups, foreclosure on the Arrow
Contract (under the Assignment of Contract), and foreclosure on
the Conk irrigation water rights (under the Security Agreement)
to recover the principal and interest on the $119,000 loan, the
$49,966.21 advance, and Plaintiffs' costs and attorney fees.

(R.

at 463.)
9.

On December 3 and 5, 1980, the Dewsnups paid Plaintiffs

all principal and interest due on the $119,000 loan, but the
Dewsnups neither reimbursed Plaintiffs for the $49,966.21 advance
nor for any costs and attorney fees incurred in collection of the
Promissory Notes or the $49,966.21 advance.

(R. at 462-63, 598-

600.)
10.

On March 3, 1981, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment for the $4 9,966.21 advance, $6,985 in attorney fees, and
$53.50 in costs.

(R. at 462.)
9

11.

On April 24, 1981, the trial court entered a Summary

Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure (the "Judgment") awarding
Plaintiffs judgment against the Dewsnups for the $49,966.21
advance, $6,985 in attorney fees, and $53.50 in costs.

(R. at

462.)
13.

On August 29, 1988, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of

Default on the Trust Deed.
14.

(R. at 461.)

Plaintiffs did not send a copy of the Notice of Default

by certified or registered mail to the Dewsnups.
15.

(R. at 461.)

On or about March 24, 1994, Plaintiffs scheduled a

nonjudicial trustee's sale of the Trust Deed Property for April
29, 1994.
16.

(R. at 461.)
Plaintiffs did not send the Dewsnups a copy of the

Notice of Sale by certified or registered mail.
17.

(R. at 461.)

Paragraph 21 of the Trust Deed provides that u[t]he

undersigned Trustor [the Dewsnups] requests a copy of any notice
of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to
[them]."
18.

(R. at 460-61.)
On March 28, 1994, the Dewsnups served their First Set

of Interrogatories arid Request for Document Production on
Plaintiffs requesting "the entire amount [Plaintiffs] claim is
due and owing under the terms of the trust deed on which
[Plaintiffs] are now foreclosing."
10

(R. at 460.)

19.

In Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' First Set of

Interrogatories and Request for Production of. Documents,
Plaintiffs claimed that $222,814.62 in debt "is due and owing
under the terms of the trust deed":
$166,835.56 12,433.30 -

43,545.76

-

The Judgment for $49,966.21,
plus $116,869.35 in interest.
The Judgment for $6,985 in
costs and attorney fees,
plus $5,448.30 in
interest.
Attorney fees and costs from
March 1987 to April 21, 1994.

$222,814.62
(R. at 459); see also Addendum B, attached hereto.
20.
Deed.

On April 29, 1994, Plaintiffs foreclosed on the Trust

(R. at 459. )
21.

Of the $222,814.62 of debt Plaintiffs claimed was

secured by the Trust Deed, Plaintiffs bid and purchased the Trust
Deed Property at the trustee's sale for $115,000.

(R. at 440;

459.)
22.

In 1996, the Utah Supreme Court held that the

$49,966.21 advance was not secured by the Trust Deed:
An examination of the "Assignment of
Contract" reveals that the Dewsnups were
obligated to repay the lenders the $49,966.21
paid under the Arrow contract. However, this
debt was not secured by the trust deed . . .

Timm II, 921 P.2d 1381, 1387-88 (Utah 1996).

11

23.

As to the award of $6,985 in attorney fees and $53.50

in costs, the Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded three
years later to determine "what amount, if any, of attorney fees
remained unpaid on the promissory notes when the sale was held."
Timm III, 1999 UT 105, ^15, 990 P.2d 942.
24.

The Promissory Notes provide for recovery of costs and

attorney fees incurred in collection of principal and interest on
the $119,000 loan:
In case of default in the payment of any
installment of principal or interest as
herein stipulated, then it shall be optional
with the legal holder of this note to declare
the entire sum hereof due and payable; and
proceedings may at once be instituted for the
recovery of the same by law, with accrued
interest and costs, including reasonable
attorney's fees.
(R. at 469.)
25.

The Assignment of Contracts does not contain an

attorney fees clause.

(R. at 222-23.)

Nor does Utah law allow

for attorney fees in the circumstances described herein.
Accordingly, there is no contractual nor statutory basis for
awarding Plaintiffs attorney fees for recovery of the $49,966.21
advance or subsequent collection actions related thereto.

See

Equitable Life & Cas. & Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("In Utah, attorney fees are awarded only if
authorized by statute or contract.
12

If provided for by contract,

attorney fees are awarded in accordance with the terms of that
contract."
26.

(Internal citations omitted)).
On September 8, 2000 and November 13, 2000, the trial

court held evidentiary hearings to determine the amount of costs
and attorney fees incurred in collection of principal and
interest on the Promissory Notes at the time the principal and
interest was paid in full (December 5, 1980) and to determine the
amount of costs and attorney fees secured by the Trust Deed as of
the date of the foreclosure sale (April 29, 1994).

(R. at 936;

937.)
27.

Plaintiffs claimed they had incurred a total of $5,000

in costs and attorney fees related to collection of both the
Promissory Notes and the $49,966.21 advance as of December 5,
1980.

(R. at 937, page 8, line 18-21.)
28.

As to the $5,000 in costs and attorneys fees claimed as

of December 5, 1980, Plaintiffs did not distinguish between costs
and attorney fees incurred in collection of principal and
interest on the Promissory Note and costs and attorney fees
incurred in collection of the $49,966.21 advance. (R. at 937,
pages 19-21.) 2
2

Wendell Bennett (Plaintiffs' attorney as of December 5,
1980) testified at the November 13, 2000 hearing on attorney fees
that plaintiffs had not asked him to make such an allocation and
that he had not made such an allocation. (R. at 937, page 21,
lines 5-8.) Although Mr. Bennett initially testified that he
13

29.

The trial court allocated the entire $5,000 to "costs

and attorney fees expended by the Plaintiffs" "to collect the
sums due under the Promissory Notes."
30.

(R. at 780.)

From December 5, 1980 through April 29, 1994,

Plaintiffs claimed that they had incurred $83,911.67 in costs and
attorney fees in pursuing collection of the $49,966.21 advance
and other claims that plaintiffs had against the Dewsnups after
December 5, 1980.

(R. at 781; 936, pages 60-83; 937, pages 25-

31; Exhibits 1, 2 and 6.)
31.

As to the $83,911.67 in costs and attorneys fees

Plaintiffs claimed were incurred after December 5, 1980,
Plaintiffs did not distinguish between costs and attorney fees
incurred in collection of the $49,966.21 advance or otherwise
incurred. (R. 936, page 70, lines 12-15.) 3

didn't think he could allocate the $5,000 in costs and attorneys
fees incurred as of December 5, 1980 between those incurred in
collection of the Promissory Notes and those incurred in
collection of the $49,966.21 advance, he later conceded that he
"might be able to" do so. (Cf. R. at 93 7, page 20, line 4; R. at
937, page 21, lines 1-4.)
3

Michciel Hayes testified on behalf of plaintiffs, on both
September B, 2 0 00 and November 13, 2 000, regarding attorney fees
and costs incurred by plaintiffs after December 5, 1980. At the
September 8, 2000 hearing, Mr. Hayes testified that plaintiffs
had made no allocation of the claimed $83,911.67 in costs and
attorney fees incurred after December 5, 1980 among the "various
causes of action" that plaintiffs were pursuing against the
Dewsnups after that date. (R. 936, page 70, lines 12-15.) On the
November 18, 2000 hearing date, Mr. Hayes testified that
plaintiffs still had made "no allocation on any basis." (R. 937,
14

32.

The trial court found that the entire $83,911.67 was

secured by the Trust Deed and owed by the Dewsnups.
33.

(R. at 781.)

The trial court found that the amount secured by the

Trust Deed at the time of April 29, 1994 trustee's sale was
$88,911.67, which equaled $5,000 incurred prior to December 5,
1980 plus $83,911.67 incurred between December 5, 1980 and April
29, 1994.
34.

(R. at 781.)
On December 20, 2000, the Dewsnups filed a Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment on their claim of wrongful foreclosure,
alleging that the April 29, 1994 nonjudicial trustee's sale was
defective because it was (1) barred by the statute of
limitations, (2) not secured by the Trust Deed, (3) barred by the
one-action rule, and (4) procedurally defective because neither a
notice of default nor a notice of sale had been mailed to the
Dewsnups. (R. at 832-48.)
35.

On February 12, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment.
36.

(R. at 849-51.)

On September 24, 2001, the Court entered an Order

granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and denying the
Dewsnups' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

(R. at 925-27);

see also Addendum C, attached hereto.
37.

On April 24, 1992, the Dewsnups paid $3,362.37 to

page 27, lines 13-21.*)
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Plaintiffs through the United States District Court for the
District of Utah.

(R. at 448-49.)

Plaintiffs did not give the

Dewsnups credit for this payment against any costs and attorney
fees that may have been owing.4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in failing to allocate the costs and
attorney fees incurred by Plaintiffs.

Only costs and attorney

fees incurred in collecting the principal and interest due under
the Promissory Notes prior to the date the principal and interest
was paid in full (December 5, 1980) and costs and attorney fees
incurred in conducting the trustees sale were either recoverable
or secured by the Trust Deed.
The April 29, 1994 trustee's sale (1) violated the "one
action" rule, as set forth under Section 78-37-1 of the Utah Code
Ann., because Plaintiffs already had a judgment against the
Dewsnups for the same debt foreclosed on at the trustee's sale,
(2) was bairred by the applicable statute of limitations, as
defined under Section 78-12-23 of the Utah Code Ann., because the
trustee's sale was held more than six years after the default on
the Promissory Notes, and (3) foreclosed on the Trust Deed for

4

Plaintiffs' claim for $88,911.67 in costs and attorney
fees did not give the Dewsnups credit for this payment. See
Paragraphs 27, 30, 32 and 3 3 above, and citations to the record
set forth therein.
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debt not secured by the Trust Deed, and (4) the trustee's sale
was procedurally defective because Plaintiffs did not send the
Dewsnup a copy of either the notice of default or the notice of
sale as required by statute.
The trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment, thereby dismissing all of the Dewsnups'
counterclaims, including wrongful foreclosure, breach of the
implied covenant/duty of good faith and fair dealing, intentional
and/or reckless infliction of emotional distress, failure to
reconvey trust deed, and punitive damages.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF $5,000 IN COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES INCURRED PRIOR TO DECEMBER 5, 1980 SHOULD BE
REVERSED.

As a matter of law, Plaintiffs and the trial court should
have but failed to properly allocate costs and attorney fees.
An award of attorney fees must be based on
the evidence and supported by findings of
fact. . . .[Al party seeking fees must
allocate its fee request according to its
underlying claims. . . .The trial court . .
. must make an independent evaluation of the
reasonableness of the requested fees in light
of the parties' evidentiary submissions.
. . .The trial court should also document its
evaluation of the requested fees'
reasonableness through findings of fact.
These findings should mirror the requesting
party's allocation of fees per claims and
parties and should support any award issued.
[Proper findings, i.e., those that mirror the
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requesting party's allocation of fees] enable
the reviewing court to make an independent
review of the fee award, and [to determine]
whether the findings are sufficient to
support the award. . . .The findings of
fact, furthermore, should detail the factors
considered dispositive by the trial court in
calculating the award.
Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added); accord Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App. 232, 1(37, 30
P.3d 436 (quoting Foote, 962 P.2d at 55). Because both
Plaintiffs and the trial court failed to properly allocate costs
and attorney fees, the award of attorney fees cannot stand.

See

Foote, 962 P.2d at 55 (reviewing trial court's findings on award
of fees for correctness).
A.

Plaintiffs Failed to Allocate Costs and Attorney Fees

As previously stated, u a party seeking fees must allocate
its fee request according to its underlying claims."

Id. at 55.

Indeed, the party must categorize the time
and fees expended for "(1) successful claims
for which there may be an entitlement to
attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for
which there would have been an entitlement to
attorney fees had the claims been successful,
and (3) claims for which there is no
entitlement to attorney fees." Claims must
also be categorized according to the various
opposing parties.
Id. (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiffs failed to meet this

burden when they claimed they had incurred a total of $5,000 in
costs and attorney fees related to collection of both the
18

Promissory Notes and the $4 9,966.21 advance as of December 5,
1980, but failed to allocate (or otherwise distinguish between)
costs and attorney fees incurred in collection of principal and
interest on the Promissory Note and costs and attorney fees
incurred in collection of the $49,966.21 advance.

Accordingly,

the trial court's decision to allocate the entire $5,000 to
"costs and attorney fees expended by the Plaintiffs" "to collect
the sums due under the Promissory Notes" is error and cannot
stand.
B.

(R. at 780); see also Addendum A, attached hereto.
The Trial Court Failed to Properly Allocate Costs and
Attorney Fees

As previously mentioned, "[t]he trial court . . . must make
an independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the requested
fees in light of the parties' evidentiary submissions."
962 P.2d at 55 (citation omitted).

In addition,

[t]he trial court should . . . document its
evaluation of the requested fees'
reasonableness through findings of fact.
These findings should mirror the requesting
party's allocation of fees per claims and
parties and should support any award issued.
[Proper findings, i.e., those that mirror the
requesting party's allocation of fees] enable
the reviewing court to make an independent
review of the fee award, and [to determine]
whether the findings are sufficient to
support the award. . . .The findings of
fact, furthermore, should detail the factors
considered "dispositive by the trial court in
calculating the award.
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Foote,

Id. (citations omitted).

The trial court's findings fail to

acknowledge that Plaintiffs were attempting to collect under two
separate debts -- $119,000 owed under the Promissory Notes and
$4 9,966.21 owed under the Assignment of Contract.5

The record

provides ample evidence that some (if not most) of the costs and
attorney's fees incurred by plaintiffs prior to December 5, 1980
were incurred in an attempt to recover the $49,966.21 advance.
(See, e.g., Complaint, filed September 16, 1980, setting forth a
claim for recovery of the $49,966.21 advance, R. 001.)
Accordingly, the trial court's decision to allocate all $5,000 to
collection of the Promissory Notes was error as a matter of law
(by failing to apply the applicable legal standard which requires
allocation) as well as a "clearly erroneous" finding of fact.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF $83,911.67 IN COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED AFTER DECEMBER 5, 1980
SHOULD BE REVERSED.

As a matter of law, the trial court erred in concluding that
the $83,911.67 in attorney fees incurred after December 5, 1980,

5

The Assignment of Contract does not provide an attorney
fees provision; therefore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover
attorney fees incurred in collection of the $49,966.21 debt. See
Foote, 962 P.2d at 54 ("Fees provided for by contract . . . are
allowed only in strict accordance with the terms of the
contract." (Citations omitted)). In addition, the Assignment of
Contract was not secured by the Trust Deed; thus, the trial
court's conclusion that the $5,000 in costs and attorney fees was
"secured by Plaintiffs['] Trust Deed" is clear error. (R. at
783) .
20

were secured by the Trust Deed.
Addendum A, attached hereto.

(See R. at 781; 783) ; see also

In Utah, attorney fees are

awardable only if authorized by statute or contract.

See Golden

Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985) .

"Fees

provided for by contract . . . are allowed only in strict
accordance with the terms of the contract."
54 (citations omitted).

Foote, 962 P.2d at

Further, when reviewing a contract, this

Court will resolve any ambiguity against the drafter, which in
this case is Plaintiffs.

See Culbertson v. Bd. of County

Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, Hl5, Nos. 981279, 981659, 2001 Utah LEXIS
196, at *fl5, **13 ("constru [mg] any ambiguities in the
[contract] against the prevailing parties who drafted [the
contract]").
A.

The Promissory Notes do not Allow for Recovery of Costs
and Attorney Fees after December 5, 1980.

The Promissory Notes provide the following clause:
In case of default in the payment of any
installment of principal or interest as
herein stipulated, then it shall be optional
with the legal holder of the note to declare
the entire principal sum hereof due and
payable; and proceedings may at once be
instituted for recovery of the same [i.e.,
recovery of principal and interest] by law,
with accrued interest and costs, including
reasonable attorney's fees.
(R. at 469) (emphasis added).

Once the Promissory Notes were

paid in full on December 5, 1980, there was no contractual basis
21

under the Promissory Notes to recover costs and attorney's fees
incurred thereafter.

The Promissory Notes only allow for a

recovery of costs and attorneys fees where there has been "a
default" in the payment of principal and interest and only for
recovery of "the same" (i.e., only for the recovery of the unpaid
principal and interest.)

As of December 5, 1980, there was no

principal and interest to recover under the Promissory Notes,
since all principal and interest had been paid in full.
Accordingly, after December 5, 1980 no costs and attorney's fees
could have been incurred for recovery of "the same" (i.e., for
recovery of unpaid principal and interest.)
Furthermore, there was no "default" in the payment of
principal and interest after December 5, 1980.

A "default" is

defined as "[t]he omission or failure to perform a legal or
contractual duty; esp.,

the failure to pay a debt when due."

Black's Law Dictionary 428 (7th ed. 1999).

Because all the

principal and interest due on the Promissory Notes were paid in
full by December 5, 1980, the Dewsnups were no longer in
"default" in the payment of principal and interest as of December
5, 1980 and could not be held liable under the Promissory Notes
for costs and attorney fees incurred by plaintiffs after December
5, 1980.
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Even though some costs and attorney fees were owing under
the Promissory Notes which had been incurred prior to December 5,
1980 in collecting unpaid principal and interest due under the
Promissory Notes, the Promissory Notes do not allow for recovery
of any attorney fees that may have been incurred in collection of
those attorney fees.

Once all principal and interest on the

Promissory Notes was paid in full on December 5, 1980, there was
no further contractual basis under the Promissory Notes for
Plaintiffs to recover any costs and attorney fees thereafter
incurred by plaintiffs for any reason.

See Softsolutions, Inc.

v. Briaham Young Univ.. 2000 UT 46, 1(41, 1 P.3d 1095 ("If a
contract provides for attorney fees, the award 'is allowed only
in accordance with the terms of the contract.'"

(Citation

omitted)).
B.

The Trust Deeds Provide only for Recovery of Costs
Associated with Conducting the Nonjudicial Trustee's
Sale

If the August 29, 1994 nonjudicial trustee's sale was not
void (for the reasons hereafter discussed), the Dewsnups
acknowledge that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover costs and
attorney fees incurred in conducting the August 29, 1994
nonjudicial trustee's sale under Paragraph 16 of the Trust Deed:
Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder,
Beneficiary shall have the option to declare
all sums secured hereby immediately due and
23

payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the
manner provided by law for the foreclosure of
mortgages on real property and Beneficiary
shall be entitled to recover in such
proceeding all costs and expenses incident
thereto, including a reasonable attorney's
fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the
court.
(R. at 116); see also Addendum D, attached hereto.

However, no

other costs and attorney fees incurred after December 5, 1980
could have been either recoverable or secured by the Trust Deed.
C.

Costs and Attorney Fees are not Recoverable for
Collecting the $49,966.21 Advance

After the Promissory Notes were paid in full in December
1980, no costs and attorney fees could have been incurred in
collection of the Promissory Notes.

See Section II (A). The

$83,911.67 in costs and attorney fees incurred between March,
1987 and April 29, 1994 therefore had to be incurred in
collecting the $49,966.21 due under the Assignment of Contract,
or the costs and attorney fees incurred in collecting the costs
and attorney fees incurred in collecting the Promissory Notes and
the $49,966.21 advance incurred prior to December 5, 1980.6
Attorney fees incurred in collecting the $4 9,966.21 due under the
Assignment of Contract are irrelevant because that debt was not

6

As pireviously indicated, both Plaintiffs and the trial
court failed to make a proper allocation of costs and attorney
fees incurred in connection with this case. See Section I (A)
and (B) of this brief.
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secured by the Trust Deed.

See Timm II. 921 P.2d at 1388

(stating that "the Dewsnups were obligated to repay [Plaintiffs]
the $49,966.21 . . . .
trust deed")

However, this debt was not secured by the

In addition, the Assignment of Contract had no

attorney fees provision; thus, there is no contractual basis for
recovery of the costs and attorney fees related to the $49,966.21
advance.

See Golden Key Realty, Incf 699 P.2d at 734.

Accordingly, the trial court's finding that the Dewsnups were
responsible for $83,911.67 in costs and attorney fees incurred
after December 5, 1980 and that such amount was secured by the
Trust Deed should be set aside.

(R. at 781); see also Addendum

A, attached hereto; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
D.

Plaintiffs Failed to Allocate Costs and Attorney
Fees.

As previously discussed in connection with costs and
attorney fees due prior to December 5, 1980 (Section 1(A)), "a
party seeking fees must allocate its fee request according to its
underlying claims."

See Foote, 962 P.2d at 55.

Plaintiffs' also

failed to meet this burden in connection with the $83,911.67 in
costs and attorney fees incurred after December 5, 1980, by
failing to allocate (or otherwise distinguish between) costs and
attorney fees that were recoverable under Paragraph 16 of the
Trust Deed and all other costs and attorneys fees that were not
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recoverable.
E.

The Trial Court Failed to Properly Allocate Costs and
Attorney Fees.

As also previously discussed in connection with costs and
attorney fees due prior to December 5, 1980 (Section 1(B)),
xx

[t]he trial court . . . must make an independent evaluation of

the reasonableness of the requested fees in light of the parties'
evidentiary submissions."
omitted).

Foote, 962 P.2d at 55 (citation

The trial court also failed to meet this burden in

connection with the $83,911.67 in costs and attorney fees
incurred after December 5, 1980, by failing to allocate (or
otherwise distinguish between) costs and attorney fees that were
recoverable under Paragraph 16 of the Trust Deed and all other
costs and attorneys fees that were not recoverable.
F.

Plaintiffs are Estopped from Claiming Additional Costs
and Attorney Fees.

As a matter of equity, Plaintiffs are estopped from claiming
additional costs and attorney fees associated with the
foreclosure sale.

Equitable estoppel is applicable when the

following three elements are present:
(I) a statement, admission, act, or failure
to act by one party inconsistent with a claim
later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or
inaction by the other party taken or not
taken on the basis of the first party's
statement, admission, act, or failure to act;
and (iii) injury to the second party that
26

would result from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such statement,
admission, act, or failure to act.
Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs. , Inc., 1999 UT 100, ^[34, 989
P.2d 1077 (citation omitted).

"The doctrine of equitable

estoppel is based upon fundamental notions of justice and fair
dealing."

Smotherman v. Columbus Hotel Co., 741 So.2d 259, 265

(internal quotations and citation omitted).

Because all three

elements are satisfied in the present case, the doctrine of
equitable estoppel prevents Plaintiffs from claiming additional
costs and attorney fees.
i.

Plaintiffs made inconsistent statements

In 1994, at the time of the foreclosure sale, Plaintiffs
claimed that the debt for which the Trust Deed was foreclosed
included $6,985 in costs and attorney fees awarded under the
judgment, plus interest, and $43,545.76 in costs and attorney
fees incurred between March 1987 and April 21, 1994.
425); see also Addendum B, attached hereto, at 2.
later,

(See R. at

Six years

however, at evidentiary hearings held in September and

November 2000, Plaintiffs' figure jumped from $50,530.76 ($6,985
plus $43,545.76) to $88,911.67.

(See R. at 936:30.)

Plaintiffs'

inconsistent statements satisfy the first element under Nunley.
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ii.

The Dewsnups acted reasonably after Plaintiffs' initial
statement

Under Sections 57-1-31 and 57-1-40 of the Utah Code Ann.,
the Dewsnups are entitled to rely on a representation as to the
payoff at the time of the foreclosure sale.

See Utah Code Ann. §

57-1-31(1) (Supp. 2001) (allowing debtor to "cure the existing
default" by "pay[ing] . . . the beneficiary . . . the entire
amount then due under the terms of [the] trust deed"); see id. §
57-1-40(1) (a) (2000) (allowing reconveyance of the trust deed if
"obligation secured by the trust deed . . . has been fully
paid").

Under these circumstances, the Dewsnups' actions are

reasonable, and therefore the second element under Nunley is
satisfied.
iii. Allowing Plaintiffs to repudiate their initial
statement will injure the Dewsnups
If this Court allows Plaintiffs to repudiate their initial
statement, the Dewsnups will be injured in the amount of
$38,380.91, which equals the difference between $50,530.76 and
$88,911.67.

Accordingly, all three elements of equitable

estoppel are met, and therefore Plaintiffs should not be allowed
to claim additional costs and attorney fees.
G.

Failure to Give Credit for $3,362.37 Payment.

On April 24, 1992, the Dewsnups paid $3,362.37 to
plaintiffs.

It is undisputed that Plaintiffs did not give the
28

Dewsnups credit for this payment against the costs and attorney
fees claimed due.

(See Paragraph 30, Statement of Facts.)

It is

the Dewsnups' position that this payment would have more that
covered the portion of the $5,000 in costs and attorney fees
allocable to collection of the Promissory Notes and the Trust
Deed should have been released at that time.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEWSNUPS7 MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
As a matter of law, the trial court erred in denying the
Dewsnups' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Summary judgment

is appropriate when there are no disputes as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The Dewsnups' Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment should have been granted because there are no
disputes as to any material facts and the Dewsnups were entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
A.

The Dewsnups Are Entitled to Summary Judgment Because
the Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sale Violated the "OneAction" Rule

Under Section 78-37-1 of the Utah Code Ann., Plaintiffs can
bring only "one action" for the recovery of debt secured by a
mortgage on real property.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (1996).

More specifically, Section 78-1-37 provides that u[t]here can be
but one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of
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any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate . . . ."
Id.

This Court has long recognized that the one-action rule

requires that " [a] creditor must foreclose and have a deficiency
determined by the court before proceeding against the debtor
personally."

City Consumer Servs., Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234,

235 (Utah 1991) (citation omitted).

Further, "[t]he [one-action]

rule obviously applies to a creditor whose loan is in default to
bar it from suing the debtor personally on the note until it
first forecloses against the real property."

Id. at 236.

When a

secured creditor sues on an underlying debt without first
foreclosing on the trust deed, the creditor makes an election of
remedies, electing the single action of the judicial proceeding,
and thereby waives its right to sell the security under a power
of sale.

As stated in Walker v. Community Bank, 518 P.2d 329

(Cal. 1974),
since . . . "[there] can be but one form of
action for the recovery of any debt" secured
by a mortgage or deed of trust on real
property, where the creditor sues on the
obligation . . . against the debtor without
seeking therein foreclosure of such mortgage
or trust deed, he [or she] makes an election
of remedies, electing the single remedy of a
personal action, and thereby waives his [or
her] right to foreclose on the security or to
sell the security under a power of sale.
Id. at 331 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted);
see also City Consumer Servs., Inc., 815 P.2d at 236 (noting that
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California's one-action rule "is virtually identical to Utah's
one-action rule").
Plaintiffs violated the "one-action" rule when they
conducted the nonjudicial foreclosure sale after having had
already sued the Dewsnups on the underlying debt.

Plaintiffs

filed a Complaint and obtained a judgment against the Dewsnups
personally without first foreclosing on the Trust Deed.

The

resulting Summary Judgment and Foreclosure Decree granted
Plaintiffs a judgment against the Dewsnups personally for the
$49,966.21 advance, together with interest thereon, $6,985 for
attorney fees and $33.50 in costs:
[T]here is now due and owing to the
plaintiffs from the [the Dewsnups], the
principal sum of $47,880.50, which is
accruing interest at the rate of $23.61 per
day from and after June 2, 1980, and the
principal sum of $2,085.71, which is accruing
interest at the rate of $1.02 per day from
and after June 7, 1980, which accrual of
interest shall continue until paid, together
with $53.50 for court costs, and $6,985.00
for the costs of collection, including
attorney's fees, and plaintiffs are granted
judgment against the . . . Dewsnup[s] in said
amount.
(R. at 426.)

As stated herein, however, once Plaintiffs made

their "election of remedies" to collect the debt judicially,
Plaintiffs waived their right, under the "one-action" rule, to
non-judicially foreclose on the Trust Deed for the same debt.
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Walker, 518 P.2d at 331.

Nevertheless, the trial court allowed

Plaintiffs to foreclose on the Trust Deed under a nonjudicial
power of sale for the same debt for which Plaintiffs had obtained
the earlier judgment against the Dewsnups, i.e., the $49,966.21
advance, $6,985 in attorney fees, $53.50 in costs and postjudgment interest.7

Accordingly, the nonjudicial foreclosure

sale violated the "one-action" rule, and therefore the
nonjudicial foreclosure sale is void as a matter of law.
B.

The Dewsnups Are Entitled to Summary Judgment Because
the Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sale was Barred by the
Statute of Limitations

Under Section 57-1-34 of the Utah Code Ann.,

xx

[t]he

trustee's sale of property under a trust deed shall be made . . .
within the period prescribed by law for the commencement of an
action on the obligation secured by the trust deed."
Ann. § 57-1-34 (2000) (emphasis added).

Utah Code

In the present case, the

"the obligation secured by the trust deed" is the Promissory
Notes.

Id.

In Utah, the statutory period for bringing a claim

under a promissory note is six years.

See id. § 78-12-23(2)

(1996) ("An action may be brought within six years . . . upon any
7

In addition to foreclosing on the Dewsnups' property for
the $49,966.21 advance, $6,985 in attorney fees, $53.50 in costs
and post-judgment interest, Plaintiffs also foreclosed on the
Trust Deed for $43,545.76 in attorney fees and costs incurred by
Plaintiffs from March, 1987 to April 21, 1994. The Judgment did
not award Plaintiffs post judgment attorney fees.
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contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in
writing").

Because Plaintiffs brought their claim under the

Promissory Notes after six years, the nonjudicial foreclosure
sale was barred by the statute of limitations, and therefore the
resulting judgment is void as a matter of law.
Nevertheless, the trial court denied the Dewnups' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on this issue, relying on 11 U.S.C. §
362(a)8 and Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-41,9 and found that the
Dewsnups' bankruptcy tolled the running of the statute of
limitations.

(See R. at 916-17.)

In so doing, the trial court

ignored the fact that Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Default on
August 29, 1988, during the same time Plaintiffs now claim the
statute of limitations was tolled because 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)
stayed Plaintiffs from "the commencement . . . of a[n] . . .
action or proceeding against the [Dewsnups] . . . ."

11 U.S.C.A.

§ 362(a)(1) (1993).
8

Title 11, Section 362(a), of the United States Code states
that a petition filed . . . operates as a stay, applicable to
all entities, of . . . the commencement or continuation . . . of
a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against
the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the
commencement of the case under th[e] [Bankruptcy Code]." 11
U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(1) (1993).
w

9

Section 78-12-41 of the Utah Code Ann. provides: "When the
commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or a statutory
prohibition the time of the continuance of the injunction or
prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement
of the action." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-41 (1996).
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Plaintiffs are estopped from applying 11 U.S.C. 362(a) when
it is convenient for them.

Cf. Strichting Mayflower Mountain

Fonds v. Jordanelle Special Serv. Dist., 2001 UT App. 257, f25,
429 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Thorne, J., dissenting) ("Th[e] doctrine
[of judicial estoppel] prevents parties from "playing 'fast and
loose' with the court or blowing 'hot and cold' during the course
of litigation."

Further, judicial estoppel 'seeks to prevent a

litigant from asserting a position [that is] inconsistent,
conflicts with, or is contrary to one that [he or] she has
previously asserted in the same or in a previous proceeding.'"
(Citations omitted) (third and fourth alterations in original)).
If 11 U.S.C. 362(a) tolls the statute of limitations on the
trustee's sale as Plaintiffs now claims, then the August 29, 1988
Notice of Default is void because it was recorded in violation of
the automatic stay.
In short, Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways.

If the

Notice of Default was not recorded in violation of the automatic
stay, then the automatic stay did not toll the statute of
limitations beyond August 29, 1988.

The trustee's sale was held

on April 29, 1994 (5 years and 8 months after the Notice of
Default was recorded).

The statute of limitations on the

Promissory Notes began to run on June 1, 1980, and as of April
16, 1981, the date the trial court entered its Summary Judgment,
34

the running of the statute of limitations was not tolled by the
Dewsnups' bankruptcy.

The period of time between August 29, 1988

and April 29, 1994, together with the time between June 1, 1980
and April 16, 1981, exceeds the six-year statute of limitations.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in concluding that the
trustee's sale was not barred by the statute of limitations.
In fact, the bankruptcy court's opinion in the Dewsnups'
adversary action filed in 1987 is consistent with the Dewsnups'
position that the Trust Deed property was abandoned and therefore
was no longer subject to the automatic stay:
There is no evidence before the Court as to whether
this real property has been abandoned to the debtors or
whether the trustee intends to do so. However, this
adversary proceeding only states a cause of action if
the property is abandoned. [The Dewsnups'] request can
only make analytical sense in conjunction with an
abandonment from the trustee, either pursuant to
Section 554(a) or (b) upon the filing and granting of
an appropriate motion for abandonment), or as a result
of the operation of Section 554 ( c) (deeming property
"not otherwise administered" to be abandoned at the
time of the closing of the c a s e ) . . . . Therefore, for
the purpose of this opinion, the Court will assume that
the real property has been or will be abandoned to the
debtors.
Memorandum Opinion, issued June 15, 1988, Judge Glen E. Clark,
Adversary Proceeding No. 87PC-0116; In re: LaMar Dewsnup and
Aletha Dewsnup, Bankruptcy No. 84C-01746, footnote 1.
See R. at 21.)

(R. 21.)

As set forth therein, the Bankruptcy Court found

that "this adversary proceeding only states a cause of action if
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the property is abandoned" (and therefore no longer subject to
the automatic bankruptcy stay).

On August 29, 1988, 2% months

after that opinion had been issued, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of
Default against the Property.

Plaintiffs clearly understood from

that opinion that the Bankruptcy Court deemed the Property
"abandoned" and the automatic bankruptcy stay was no longer in
effect.
C.

The Dewsnups Are Entitled to Summary Judgment Because
the Foreclosed Debt was Not Secured by the Trust Deed

In Utah, a creditor can only foreclose on a secured debt.
See, e.g., Timm II, 921 P.2d at 1388 (stating that creditor
cannot collect on an unsecured debt).; Timm III, 1999 UT 105, 1l3
("[A]

x

trust property may be sold . . . after a breach of an

obligation for which the trust property is conveyed as security.'
It cannot be sold for other amounts."

(Citation omitted)); see

also Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23 (Supp. 2001) . According to
Plaintiffs' answers to interrogatories, the Trust Deed secured
$222,814.62 in debt, which is broken down as follows:
$166,835.56 -- for the $49,966.21 advance
plus $116,869.35 in postjudgment interest thereon
$ 43,545.30 - - i n costs and attorney fees
incurred between March 198 7
and April 21, 1994
$ 12,433.30 -- for $6,985 in costs and
attorney fees awarded under
the judgment, plus $5,448.3 0
in post-judgment interest
$222,814.62
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(See R. at 425.)

On April 29, 1994, Plaintiffs held a trustee's

sale on the Trust Deed property and purchased the property by
bidding $115,000 of the $222,814.62 in debt Plaintiffs claimed
was secured by the Trust Deed.

(See R. at 44 0.)

The Trustee's

Deed, which conveyed-the Trust Deed property to Plaintiffs,
states that the trustee sold the property to Plaintiffs for
"$115,000.00 . . .

in partial satisfaction of the indebtedness

then secured by the Deed of Trust."

(R. at 440) .

However, the only debt that was secured by the Trust Deed
was that portion of the $5,000 in costs and attorney fees
incurred as of December 5, 1980 that was allocable to collection
of the Promissory Notes and the costs and attorney fees incurred
in connection with the trustee's sale.

The Dewsnups had the

right to obtain a reconveyance of the Trust Deed upon payment of
that amount.

See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31(1) (Supp. 2001); see

also 57-1-40 (1) (a) (2000).

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs represented

to the Dewsnups that $222,814.62 in debt was secured by the Trust
Deed, (see R. at 425) , and then Plaintiffs purchased the Trust
Deed property at the trustee's sale by bidding $115,000 of the
$222,814.62 debt allegedly owed.

(See R. at 440).

The trial court concluded that because an earlier summary
judgment entered in Plaintiffs' favor, (in which Plaintiffs
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erroneously asserted that the $49,966.21 debt was secured by the
Trust Deed), had not been overturned by this Court when the April
29, 1994 trustee's sale was held, "Plaintiffs were acting under a
valid summary judgment" at the time they conducted the trustee's
sale.

(R. at 917).

In light of this Court's decision in Timm

III, the trial court's ruling is clear error and should be
reversed.
Where the issue of whether a debt is secured by a trust deed
is being litigated, the creditor holds a foreclosure sale on that
debt at its own risk.

The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged this

point in its previous rulings in this case:
The lenders were on notice that [Mrs.]
Dewsnup contested the amount, secured by the
trust deed, that they claimed she owed.
Before that issue was resolved, the lender
proceeded with the foreclosure sale for the
full amount claimed by them which amount we
found to be excessive in Timm II. While
[Mrs.] Dewsnup's failure to stay the sale may
prevent her from recovering the property if
it was sold to a bonafide purchaser, see Timm
II, she may pursue her claim for damages.
See Richards v. Baum, 914 P.2d 719 (Utah
1996) .
We must therefore again remand this case to
the trial court to determine what amount, if
any, of attorneys fees remained unpaid on the
promissory-notes when the sale was held. It
was only for that amount that the foreclosure
sale could have legally been held. For all
amounts in excess of that amount, the sale
was defective.
Timm III, 1999 UT 105, Uf14-15 (emphasis added).
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Accordingly,

Plaintiffs may not "hide behind" a judgment that has since been
reversed.
The trial court also concluded that under Utah Code Ann.,
Section 57-1-29, the trustee was allowed to hold a foreclosure
sale and to credit bid unsecured debt held by the beneficiary of
the Trust Deed which was being foreclosed.

Specifically, the

trial court stated:
Utah Code allows a trustee to apply the
proceeds of a sale to those legally entitled
to the proceeds. Defendants owed $88,911.67
in attorneys fees. The plaintiffs bid in
$115,000 of the debt. After applying this to
the $88,911.67 the excess proceeds were
applied to the $49,966.21 judgment lien on
the Arrow Contract.
(R. at 919). The trial court, however, failed to recognize that
at the time of the foreclosure sale, Plaintiffs did not "apply"
the difference between $88,911.67 and $115,000 to the unsecured
debt.

In fact, according to the Trustee's Deed, Plaintiffs

purchased the Trust Deed property at the foreclosure sale for
"$115,000.00 . . .

in partial satisfaction of the indebtedness

then secured by the Deed of Trust." (R. at 440.)

As previously

discussed, this Court has already determined that the $49,966,21
debt was not secured by the Trust Deed.

See Timm II, 921 P.2d at

1388 (stating that "the $49,966.21 . . . debt was not secured by
the trust deed").
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Furthermore, to allow a creditor to foreclose on property
and to credit bid unsecured debt at the foreclosure sale as part
of the purchase price is just like allowing the creditor to
foreclose on the property for unsecured debt.

Under Utah law, a

trust deed cannot be foreclosed for a debt that is not secured by
the trust deed.

See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23 (Supp. 2001); see

also Timm III, 1999 UT 105, fl3, 990 P.2d 942 ("[A trust
property] cannot be sold for other amounts.").

This Court

recognized this principle in First Security Bank of Utah v.
Shiew, 609 P.2d 952 (Utah 1980), stating that "to attempt to
foreclose

. on the mortgager's home for debts incurred in

operating a business and which debts are not specifically covered
by the mortgage would be unconscionable and contrary to public
policy."
D.

.Id. at 955-56 (internal quotations omitted).
The Dewsnups Are Entitled to Summary Judgment Because
Plaintiffs Failed to Mail the Dewsnups a Notice of
Default or a Notice of Sale

Under Section 57-1-26 of the Utah Code, Plaintiffs are
required to mail both a notice of default and a notice of sale to
any person requesting such notices.

Specifically, Section 57-1-

26 states10:

10

The Dewsnups cite to the most recent version of Section
57-1-26, which does not differ materially from the versions which
were in place at the time of the default and trustee's sale.
Compare Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-26(2) (Supp. 2001), with id. § 571-26(2) (Supp. 1981), and icL § 57-1-26(2) (1994).
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Not later than ten days after recordation of
a notice of default, the trustee or
beneficiary shall mail, by certified or
registered mail, with postage prepaid, a copy
of the notice of default with the recording
date shown, addressed to each person whose
name and address are set forth in a request
that has been recorded prior to the filing
for record of the notice of default, directed
to the address designated in the request. At
least 2 0 days before the date of sale, the
trustee shall mail, by certified or
registered mail, return receipt requested
with postage prepaid, a copy of the notice of
the time and place of sale, addressed to each
person whose name and address are set forth
in a request that has been recorded prior to
the filing for record of the notice of
default, directed to the address designated
in the request.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-26(2) (Supp. 2001).

The Dewsnups requested

through the Trust Deed that both the notice of default and the
notice of sale be mailed to them as trustor.

See Addendum D at

f21 (stating that "[t]he undersigned Trustor requests that a copy
of any notice and default and . . . any notice of sale hereunder
be mailed to him [or her]")

Plaintiffs, however, failed to send

the Dewsnups a copy of either the notice of default or the notice
of sale, and thereby failed to comply with the statutory
requirements of conducting a trustee's sale.

As such, the

foreclosure sale is defective and therefore should be set aside
as a matter of law.
The trial court, nevertheless, concluded that Plaintiffs'
failure to provide the Dewsnups with statutory notice of default
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and sale was "[im]material" to its decision to deny the Dewsnups'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

(R. at 921.)

Further, the

trial court concluded that because the Dewsnups had "actual
notice" of the foreclosure sale,11 Plaintiffs were relieved of
their statutory duty to mail both the notice of default and the
notice of sale to the Dewsnups under Section 57-1-26.
921-22.)

(R. at

In so doing, the trial court relied on Concepts, Inc.

v. First Security Realty Services, Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah
1987) (per curiam), which is inapposite because the debtors
therein were served with a notice of sale, albeit technically
flawed, and a notice of default was posted on the property to be
sold, see id. at 1159; whereas the debtors in the present case
(the Dewsnups) received neither a notice of default nor a notice
of sale.

Accordingly, the sale should be set aside to avoid the

"unjust extremes" of the Dewsnups not being notified of the
default and sale.

Id. at 1159, 1160.

In addition, the sale should be set aside because the trial
court's ruling renders the debtors' statutory rights in
foreclosure a dead letter.

A notice of default is intended to

give the debtor 90 days to cure the default before a sale is

^Although the trial court's memorandum decision is not
entirely clear, the trial court apparently believed that because
the Dewsnups became aware of the foreclosure sale through the
newspaper, Plaintiffs were relieved of their statutory duty under
Section 57-1-26(2) .
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scheduled.

See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31(1) (Supp. 2001) (stating

that debtor may "cure the existing default" by tendering the
amount due "within three months of the filing for record of
notice of default").

In this case, because the notice of default

was not sent to the Dewsnups, they did not have the opportunity
to "cure the existing default."

Id.

Further, because the

Dewsnups did not receive notice of default, they were not able to
have their Motion to Stay decided before the foreclosure sale was
held.

As such, if the property has been sold to a bonafide

purchaser, the Dewsnups have lost their right to recover the
property.

Similarly, the Dewsnups did not have 90 days to

challenge Plaintiffs' allegation as to attorney fees and other
debt alleged to be secured by the Trust Deed.

By having to wait

to read about the foreclosure sale in the newspaper, the Dewsnups
were deprived of the time to adequately protect their interests.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, the foreclosure sale
was defective, and therefore it should be set aside.
E. Measure of Damages.
In her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Mrs. Dewsnups
had requested damages for wrongful foreclosure in the amount of
$115,000 (the amount plaintiffs' bid for the Property at the
foreclosure sale), together with pre-judgment interest at the
statutory rate set forth in Section 15-1-1(2) (10% per annum)
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since the date of the foreclosure sale (April 29, 1994.)
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial courts' denial
of Mrs. Dewsnups' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, with
directions to enter judgment in Mrs. Dewsnup's favor in the
amount set forth above.
IV.

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Because issues of material fact were in dispute, the trial
court should not have granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Summary judgment should be granted only when "there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Civ. P. 56® (emphasis added).

Utah R.

"The presence of a dispute as to

material facts disallows the granting of a summary judgment" in
the present case, and therefore the trial court's decision to
grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment should be reversed.
Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238, 239 (Utah 1977).
The primary issue of disputed fact in the present case
involves Plaintiffs' failure to reconvey the Trust Deed Property
in a timely manner after the Dewsnups made numerous attempts to
resolve the issue of any remaining costs and attorney fees that
may have been due under the Promissory Notes.

In fact, from the

time the principal and interest on the Promissory Notes secured
by the Trust Deed were paid in full in December 1980 until the
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trustee's sale occurred on April 29, 1994, Plaintiffs have
continually and erroneously asserted that the $49,966.21 advance
and the corresponding attorney fees must first be paid before
Plaintiffs would reconvey the Trust Deed Property to the
Dewsnups.12

As the following paragraphs explain, Plaintiffs'

actions constitute unfair business practices, and the Dewsnups,
at the very least, should be allowed to pursue their claim
against Plaintiffs for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
At the evidentiary hearing, Wendall Bennett (Plaintiffs'
lawyer at the time the principal and interest on the Promissory
Notes were paid in full on December 5, 1980) freely admitted that
even though Mr. Fillerup, the Dewsnups' attorney at the time,
wanted that trust deed released after all principal and interest
has been paid, he would not release the trust deed until all
attorney fees had been paid and until the $49,966.21 unsecured
debt was paid:
A:

I wasn't dividing them out, because as
I recall, Mr. Fillerup wanted us to give
him a release of the mortgages and I
declined to do that, because my view on
this thing was it was all tied into one
bundle, and I wasn't going to allocate
it out, and I would protect my client's

12

As explained in this brief, Plaintiffs' attempt to tie the
$49,966.21 advance and the corresponding attorney fees to
Plaintiffs' failure to reconvey the Trust Deed Property to the
Dewsnups is flawed as a matter of law.
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interest in getting this thing paid.
was secured by all of that property.

It

Q:

So it was your position that the
[$49,966.21 debt! was secured by all of
that property and you weren't going to
release that [Trust Deed] until the
[$49,966.21 debt] had been paid?

A:

That's correct.

(R. at 937:17, 19) (emphasis added).
Despite Plaintiffs' flawed attempt to tie an unsecured debt
with no attorney fees provision to its decision not to reconvey
the Trust Deed Property to the Dewsnups, the Dewsnups have been
trying to obtain a release on the Trust Deed Property since
December 5, 1980.

The most notable attempts made by the Dewsnups

are as follows:
10. On or about November 28, 1984, the
Department of Agriculture approved a loan to
the Dewsnups in the amount of $40,000 to try
to get the trust deed reconveyed.
. . .[P]laintiffs rejected [the Dewsnups'
offer].
11. On or about August 26, 1988, Associated
Credit Union approved a loan for $10,000 [.]
[T]his and other moneys were used to . . .
try to get the trust deed reconveyed.
. . .[P]laintiffs rejected [the Dewsnups'
offer].
12. On April 24, 1992, $3,362.37 was paid by
Aletha Dewsnup to plaintiffs through the
United States District Court. Plaintiffs
still refused to release the trust deed.
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(R. at 448-49.)

Plaintiffs have also refused to credit the

Dewsnups' $3,362.37 payment against the amount owed at the April
29, 1994 trustee's sale.

Similarly, when the trustee's sale was

scheduled for April 29, 1994, the Dewsnups' attorney requested a
payoff of the amount required to recover the debt under the Trust
Deed, together with the entire unsecured debt of $49,966.21 and
all corresponding costs and attorney fees.
In short, Plaintiffs have refused to accept money or
otherwise negotiate release of the Trust Deed, but instead have
held the Trust Deed Property hostage as leverage to force the
Dewsnups to pay an unsecured debt, i.e., the $4 9,966.21 advance.
A creditor who holds a trust deed property hostage as leverage to
force payment of an unsecured debt does not act in "good faith by
any reckoning."

Hector, Inc. v. United Savs. & Loan Ass'nf 741

P.2d 542, 545 (Utah 1987).

Further, when one contracting party

withholds performance under a contract in order to compel another
contracting party to act under a different contract, he or she
"can hardly insist that he [or she] acted in good faith."

Swaner

v. Union Mortgage Co., 99 Utah 298, 105 P.2d 342, 346 (1940).
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment, which thereby prevented the Dewsnups from
pursuing their claim against Plaintiffs for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
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V.

COSTS ON APPEAL

Under Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
Dewsnups respectfully request costs incurred in this appeal.

See

Utah R. App. P. 34(a) (allowing appellant costs if judgment or
order is reversed, or if judgment or order is affirmed, reversed
in part, or vacated).
VI.

CONCLUSION

As a matter of law, the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law regarding the amount of costs and attorney
fees owed by the Dewsnups should be reversed because both
Plaintiffs and the trial court failed to properly allocate the
costs and attorney fees claimed or otherwise adjudged owed.
In addition, the trial court's award of $83,911.67 in
attorney fees should be reversed because those fees are not
secured by the Trust Deed and they are neither allowed under the
Promissory Notes nor under the $49,966.21 advance.

With respect

to the $5,000 awarded in costs and attorney fees, this Court
should once again remand this case for a determination of "what
amount, if any, of attorney fees remained unpaid on the
promissory notes when the sale was held."

Timm III, 1999 UT 105,

Hl5, 990 P.2d 942.
Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, Plaintiffs should
be prevented from claiming additional costs and attorney fees
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because:

(i) Plaintiffs made inconsistent statements, (ii) the

Dewsnups acted reasonably on the basis of Plaintiffs' initial
statement, and (iii) the Dewsnups will be injured if Plaintiffs
are allowed to repudiate their initial statement regarding the
amount of costs and attorney fees owed in conjunction with the
foreclosure sale.
The trial court's order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment and denying the Dewsnups' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment should be reversed.

As a matter of law, the

Dewsnups are entitled to summary judgment because the foreclosure
sale violated the "one action" rule and was barred by the statute
of limitations.

The Dewsnups are also entitled to summary

judgment because the foreclosed debt in the foreclosure was not
secured by the Trust Deed and because Plaintiffs failed to mail
the Dewsnups a notice of default and a notice of sale as Utah law
requires.

Judgment should be entered in Mrs. Dewsnup's favor and

against plaintiffs for $115,000 (the amount plaintiffs bid for
the property at the foreclosure sale) , together with interest at
the statutory pre-judgment rate of 10% per annum from April 29,
1994 (the foreclosure date) through the date judgment is entered.
In addition, the trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment because a dispute of material fact exists
regarding Plaintiffs' bad faith and unfair dealing throughout
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this case and specifically with reference to the Dewsnups'
attempt to have the Trust Deed Property reconveyed.

As stated

herein, the Dewsnups have a claim against Plaintiffs for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the
trial court's decision to grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment incorrectly'cut off the Dewsnups' opportunity to pursue
Plaintiffs for bad faith and unfair dealing.

For the reasons

stated herein, trial court's decision to grant Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment should therefore be reversed.
In closing, the Dewsnups request costs incurred in this
appeal.
DATED this 25th day of January, 2002.

/ W I As^
^ s s e l l A. Cline
Attorney for Appellant
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo-

LOUIS L. TIMM, JOHN NEIUWLAND,
and FLOYD M. CHILDS, Trustees of the
UNITED PRECISION MACHINE AND
ENGINEERING COMPANY PROFIT
SHARING TRUST; ABCO
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., a Utah
corporation; and JOSEPH L. HENRIOD,
Trustee for the ANNETTE JACOB
TRUST,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

Plaintiffs,

^ooVo
Civil No. 7191

vs.

T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and ALETHA
DEWSNUP ARROW INVESTMENT
CO., a limited partnership, THE
FEDERAL LAND BANK OF
BERKELEY; IMPERIAL LAND TITLE,
INC., as Trustee and EUGENE L.
CARSON and ELAINE CARSON as
Beneficiaries; STRINGHAM,
MAZURAN, LARSEN & SABIN, a
Professional Corporation; MINERAL
FERTILIZER CO., INC., and HARRY
V.KAPS,
Defendants.

Judge Fred D. Howard

:

—oooOooo—
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This matter came before the Court for hearing initially on September 8, 2000, at 9:00 a.m.,
and was concluded on November 13, 2000, the Honorable Fred D. Howard presiding. Plaintiffs
were represented by Michael Z. Hayes and Todd J. Godfrey. Defendant, Aletha Dewsnup, was
represented by Russell A. Cline. The Court took evidence presented by Plaintiffs and also heard
argument from the parties. The hearing was called for the purpose of determining the amount of
costs and attorneys fees owing at the time the sale of the property at issue in this matter was
conducted.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court, having considered all the evidence submitted and the arguments of the parties,
and being duly advised in the premises, hereby finds as follows:
1.

Defendants T. Lamar Dewsnup and Aletha Dewsnup originally executed 3

Promissory Note in favor of the Plaintiffs. These Notes, state, in part:
In case of default in the payment of any installment of principal or
interest as herein stipulated, then it shall be optional for the legal
holder of this Note to declare the entire principal sum hereof due and
payable; and proceedings may at once be instituted for the recovery
of the same by law, with accrued interests and costs, including
reasonable attorney's fees.
2.

From the inception of this matter to December 5,1980, Plaintiffs were required to

expend Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) in costs and attorneys fees in an attempt to collect amounts
due under the Promissory Notes executed by Defendants.
3.

The Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) in costs and attorneys fees expended by the

Plaintiffs were expended in an effort to collect the sums due under the Promissory Notes. The Five
Thousand Dollars ($5,000) was paid for costs actually incurred and for legal work actually
3l\Timm\4\FOF-COL Attorney's Fees
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performed and the expenditures and the legal work performed were reasonably necessary to
adequately prosecute the matter.
4.

From December 5,1980, to April 29,1994, Plaintiffs were required to expend Eighty-

three Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 67/100 ($83,911.67) in costs and attorneys fees
in an attempt to collect amounts due under the Promissory Notes executed by Defendants, and to
protect Plaintiffs security for the payment of said notes.
5.

The Eighty-three Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 67/100 ($83,911.67)

was paid for costs actually incurred and for legal work actually performed and the expenditures and
the legal work performed were reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter and to
preserve Plaintiffs' interest in the property which secured payment of all sums due under the
Promissory Notes.
6.

Of the Eighty-eight Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 67/100 ($88,911.67)

paid by Plaintiffs between the inception of this case and April 29, 1994, Eleven Thousand Eight
Hundred Ninety-six Dollars and 07/100 ($11,896.07) were taxes on the property which served as
security for payment of the Promissory Notes. The taxes were paid to avoid a tax sale of the property
and in order to preserve the Plaintiffs' security interest.
7.

The Court finds that between December 5, 1980, and the award of Summary

Judgment by the District Court on April 14,1981, work was performed to collect sums due under
the Promissory Notes and to collect sums due for an advance paid by Plaintiffs under an Assignment
of Contract, which Assignment of Contract also served as security for the payment of sums due
under the Promissory Notes.

31\Timm\4\F0F-C0L Attorney's Fees
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8.

The Court finds that the attorneys fees expended for legal work during the time

between December 5, 1980 and April 14, 1981 are not segregable and not allocable to separate
causes of action, as pursuit of both causes of action was necessary to collect amounts due under the
Promissory Notes and to preserve Plaintiffs security interest in the property.
9.

The Court finds that all fees and costs were reasonable under the circumstances of

this case. The Court furtherfindsthat Defendant's repeated bankruptcyfilingsand efforts to prevent
non-judicial sales of the property securing payment of sums due under the Promissory Notes created
significant cost and legal expense for the Plaintiffs.
10.

The Court finds that all costs and fees incurred in bankruptcy proceedings between

1981 and 1994 were necessary to preserve Plaintiffs security interest in the property and were
incurred in an effort to recover amounts due for costs and attorneys fees under the Promissory Notes
and Trust Deed.
11.

Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 506) authorizes Plaintiffs to recover

costs and attorneys fees expended in protecting their security interest in the property of Defendant
Aletha Dewsnup.
12.

The Trust Deed which gave Plaintiffs a security interest in Aletha Dewsnup's

property authorizes recover of costs and attorneys fees expended by Plaintiffs in conducting the nonjudicial sale of the property.

31\Timm\4\F0F-C0L Attorney's Fees
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, and in consideration of the relevant law,
the Court concludes as follows:
1.

On December 5, 1980, there were Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) in costs and

attorneys fees due and owing on the Promissory Notes which amounts were secured by Plaintiffs
Trust Deed on the property..
2.

On April 29,1994, there were Eighty-eight Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars

and 67/100 ($88,911.67) in costs and attorneys fees due and owing on the Promissory Notes which
amounts were secured by Plaintiffs Trust Deed on the property.

CRIPPEN & CLINE

Russell A. Cline
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of November, 2000,1 caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS by mailing, postage prepaid,firstclass United States mail,
to the following:
Russell A. Cline
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C.

10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

31\Timm\4\FOF-COL Attorney's Fees
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Addendum B

MICHAEL Z. HAYES - 1432
MAZURAN & HAYES P.C.
1245 East Brickyard Road, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone (801) 484-6600

FILED
COUNTY CLERK & EX OFFICIO CLERK
OF THE DISTRICT COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UT^H
MILLARD COUNTY

_CLERK
.DEPUTY!

oooOooo

LOUIS L. TIMM, JOHN NEIUWLAND,
and FLOYD M. CHILDS, Trustees
of United Precision Machine
and Engineering Company Profit
Sharing Trust; ABCO Insurance
Agency, Inc., a Utah
Corporation; and JOSEPH L.
HENRIOD, Trustee for the
ANNETTE JACOB TRUST,

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
Civil No. 7191

Plaintiffs,

Judge Ray M. Harding

vs.
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and ALETHA
DEWSNUP, ARROW INVESTMENT CO.,
a Limited Partnership, et al.
Defendants.

oooOooo
Pursuant to Rules 33 and 34 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Plaintiffs

submit

the

following

responses

to

Defendants'

Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

With respect to the trustee sale

scheduled for April 29, 1994, on the Dewsnup Trust Deed, please
itemize the entire amount you claim is due and owing under the
terms of the Trust Deed.
calculation.

Please show how you arrived at each

ANSWER:

The amount due under the Trust Deed as of April 29,

1994, is $222,814.62. The above figure is arrived at by taking the
partial summary judgment of $47,880.50 together with interest at
$23,61 per day for thirteen (13) years, which totals $112,029.45;
the taxes awarded in the judgment of $2,085.71 plus $1.02 per day
interest, totaling $4,839.90 in interest; the attorney's fees
awarded in the judgment of $6,985.00 plus six percent (6%) interest
for thirteen (13) years, which totals $5,448.30. The above figures
give you a total partial summary judgment and interest to April 29,
1994f of $179,268.86. To this figure is added attorney's fees and
costs incurred from the date of the judgment in 1981 to April,
1994, which totals $34,811.00 in attorney's fees and $8,734.76 in
costs.

All of the above figures total $222,814.62.

This figure

does not include attorney's fees and costs incurred after April 1,
1994 r

nor

does

it

include

attorney's

fees

expended

by

the

Plaintiffs between April 29, 1981 and March of 1987, which is the
date that the Plaintiffs hired Michael Z. Hayes to represent them
in this case.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
REQUEST NO. 1: Produce all documents and support the figures
set forth in your answer to Interrogatory No. 1.
RESPONSE:

Attached to these requests are the copies of the

calculations used to determine the figures set forth in Plaintiffs'
answer to Interrogatory No. 1.

2

DATED this ^ ? A day of April, 1994.

MICHAEL Z. HAVES '
Attorney for Plaintiffs

STATE OF UTAH

)
* ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

Residing at:

3

day of April, 1994.

Addendum C

COUNTY&m4OOfFlooy riC

• v - ^ ^ L i ^ STRICT row
F

' SEP 2 4 "• '•
L ~ _
_
HttlARO C&UNTY

*

Michael Z. Hayes (#1432)
Todd J. Godfrey (#6094)
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C.
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-1725
Telephone: (801)272-8998
Fax: (801)272-1551
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—

LOUIS L. TIMM, JOHN NEIUWLAND,
and FLOYD M. CHILDS, Trustees of the
UNITED PRECISION MACHINE AND
ENGINEERING COMPANY PROFIT
SHARING TRUST; ABCO
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., a Utah
corporation; and JOSEPH L. HENRIOD,
Trustee for the ANNETTE JACOB
TRUST,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and ALETHA
DEWSNUP ARROW INVESTMENT
CO., a limited partnership, THE
FEDERAL LAND BANK OF
BERKELEY; IMPERIAL LAND TITLE,
INC., as Trustee and EUGENE L.
CARSON and ELAINE CARSON as
Beneficiaries; STRINGHAM,
MAZURAN, LARSEN & SABIN, a
Professional Corporation; MINERAL
FERTILIZER CO., INC., and HARRY
V. KAPS,

:
:
ORDER
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil No. 7191
&OO 14 Q 7 \C{ |
Judge Donald J. Eyre, Jr.

:
:
:
:
:
:

Defendants.
:
—oooOooo—
<-)&*•&

This matter came before the Court on the parties' cross Motions for Summary Judgment.
The Court, having considered the respective Briefs of the parties, on August 29, 2001, issued a
Memorandum Decision on the parties' cross Motions, denying Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismissing
Defendant's Couaterclaim, in its entirety, with prejudice. In consideration of the above-referenced
Memorandum Decision of the Court, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Memorandum Decision on the parties'
cross Motions for Summary Judgment is hereby adopted as the Order of the Court and Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and Defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed, in its
entirety, with prejudice.

f
is £ 4

day of September, 2001.

DATED this

BY THE COURT:
cr

v

V/
J?

Don^ld^jtri^e^r.
District Court Judge

/

APPROVED AS TO Fdftftft^
CRIPPEN & CLINE

Russell A. Cline
Attorney for Defendant Aletha Dewsnup

31\Timm\4\0rder(MSJ)

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the far^ day of September, 2001,1 caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER by mailing, postage prepaid, first class United States mail,
to the following:
Russell A. Cline
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C.

10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

31\Timm\4\Order(MSJ)
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Addendum D

EARL JAY PECK
NIELSEN,... HEMIQP./...GOTTFREDSON. & PECK
AMf? 410 Newhouse B u i l d i n g
3*i£> .S.slt...LaK.$...C.ity 4 ....U.tah...8Alll
521-3350
Space Above This Line For Recorder's Use
A M E N D E D

TRUST DEED
With Assignment of Rents
THIS TRUST DEED, made this
between ....?..•....Lal^R..DEWSNUP

1st

day of

June

t

19..78

and...^ETj^__pEWSNyP
, as TRUSTOR,

whose address is

P.?.?.?.?.??.
(Stz-eet and number)

EA?L.. JAY PECK

.y?^H

(City)

(State)

? as

TRUSTEE,* and

UNITED PRECISION MACHINE & ENGINEERING COMPANY PROFIT SHARING TRUST,
ABeO--l-N-SURAWGE--AGE-Ne-¥-r--ING^^
the Annette Jacob

Trust

, as BENEFICIARY,

WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST,
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in . . . M i l l a r d
County, State of Utah:

PARCEL ONE:
PARCEL TWO:

See Exhibit 'A1 hereto
See Exhibit 'B' hereto

25QQB

Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof,
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by 3:promissory notesof even date herewith, in the principal sum of $..3.3./..000.;....$.56.,..000 ? made 'by
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest
thereon as herein provided.
"NOTE: Trustee must be a member of the Utah State Bar; a bank, building and loan association or savings
and loan association authorized to do such business in Utah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah.

TO PROTECT I HP SLCURITi Or THIS TRLsTDELO TRUSTOR AGREES
1 To keep said propertv in good condition and repair ne t t > remove or demolish anv building thereon to
complete r restore j r mptlv and in ^ood and workmanlike m inner inv buildm„ which mav h c nstracted
damaged or destrcved thereon to complv with all 1 iws c \ n inK ind restricti ns ailccting •> nd pre pertv n t
to commit or permit waste therecf not to commit sutfer or permit inv act upe n said propertv in vi l i t n n t lnv to
d ) all other aets which from the charietcr or use of said propertv miv be reasonablv necessirv the specific
enumerations herein not excluding the general and if the loan steured herebv or anv part thereof is I cmg oh
tamed for the purpose of financing construction of impro\ements on said propertv Trustor further agrees
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursue same with reasonable dihgenc 0 to cc mpktion
in accordance with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary and
(b)

To allow Beneficiarv to inspect said property at all times during construction

Trustee upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary setting forth facts sho\ in„ a default
b> 1 rustor under this numbered paragraph is authorized to aceept as true and conclusive all taet and state
ments therein and to act thereon hereuider
2 To proviJe and maintain insurance of such type or tvpes and amounts as Beneficiarv mav require on
the improvements now existing or hereafter erected or placed on said pr pertv Such insurance sh ill he carried
in companies approved bv Beneficiarv with loss pavable clauses in favor of and in form icre | tal lc to Beneficiary
In event of loss Trustor shall give mmcdiate notice to Beneficiarv who mav make proof of loss and each insurance
compary concerned is herebv authorised md hrected to m a l e pavment t >r such less dir<ctl> i> I neliciarv
instead of to Trustor and Beneficiarv j intiv and the insurance proc eds or any part there >f mav ne applied
h\ Beneficiarv at its option to reduction of the indeb edness herebv secured cr to the rcsto a ion or repair of
the property damaged
3 To deliver to pav for and maintain with Beneficiarv until the indebtedness secured herebv is paid jn full
such evidence of title as Beneficiarv mav require including abstracts of title or policies of title insurance and
any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto
4 To appear in and defend anv action or proceeding purporting to affect the secuntv hereof the title to
said propertv or the r ghts or powers of Beneficiarv or Trustee and should Beneficiarv or Trustee elect to
also appear in or defend anv such action or proceeding to pav all costs and expenses including cost of evi
dence of title and attorney s fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee
5 To pay at least 10 d a \ s before dehnquencv all taxes and assessments affecting said pre pertv including
all assessments upon water companv stock and all rents assessments and charges for water a] purtenant to or
used in connection with said propertv to pav when due all encumbrances charges a n i hens with interest
on said property or anv part thereof which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto to pay all costs
fees and expenses of this Trust
6 Should Trustor fail to make anv payment or to do anv act as herein provided then Beneficiary or
Trustee but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing
Trustor from anv obligation hereof mav Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may
deem necessary to protect the secuntv hereof Beneficiary or Trustee bemg authorized to enter upon said
property for such purposes commence appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee pav purchase contest or compromise any
encumbrance charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto and in ex
ercismg any such powers incur any liability expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem
necessary therefor including cost of evidence of Utle employ counsel and pay his reasonable fees
7 To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder bv Beneficiarv or Trustee
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10r<:) per annum until paid and the repay
ment thereof shall be secured hereby
I T IS MUTUALLY AGREED T H A T
8 Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of anv public improvement
or condemnation proceeding or damaged bv fire or earthquake or m anv other manner Beneficiarv shall be
entitled to all compensation awards and other payments or relief theretor and shall be entitled at its option
to commence appear m and prosecute in its own name anv action or proceedings or to make anv compro
mise or settlement in connection with such taking or damage All such compensation awards damages rights
of action and proceeds including the proceeds of anv policies of fire and o t h T insurance affecting said propertv
are hereby assigned to Beneficiarv who may after deducting therefrom ad its expenses including attornev s fees
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any
compensation award damages and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee mav require
9 At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary pavment of its fees and pre
sentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconvevance for cancellation and
retention) without affecting the liability of anv person for the pavment of the indebtedness secured hereby
Trustee mav (a) consent to the makmg of anv map or plat of said propertv (b) join in granting anv ease
ment or creating any restriction thereon (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed
or the hen or charge thereof (d) reconvev without warranty all or anv part of said propertv The „rantee in
any reconvevance may be described as the person or persons entitled thereto and the recitals therein of anv
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustees
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph
10 As additional security Trustor herebv assigns Beneficiary during the continuance of these trusts all
rents issues royalties and profits of the property affected bv this Trust Deed and of anv personal property
located thereon Until Trustor shall default in the pavment of anv indebtedness secured herein or in the per
formance of any agreement hereunder Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents issues re values
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and pavable If Trustor shall default as aforesaid
Trustors right to collect any of such monevs shall cease and Beneficiarv shall have the n„ht with or without
taking possession of the property affected hereby to collect all rents rovalties issues and profits failure or
discontmuance of Beneficiary at anv time or from time to time to collect anv such monevs shall not in any
manner affect the subsequent enforcement bv Beneficiarv of the right power and authoritv to c licet the same
Nothing contained herein nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiarv to collect shall be or be construed to
be an affirmation bv Beneficiarv of any tenancv lease or option nor an assumption of liability under nor a
subordination of the hen or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancv lease or option
11 Upon any default by Trustor hereunder Beneficiary may at anv time without notice either in
person by agent or bv a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor herebv consenting to the appointment of
Beneficiary as such receiver) and without regard to the adequacy of anv secuntv for the indebtedness hereby
secured enter upon and take possession of said propertv or any part thereof in its own name sue for or
otherwise collect said rents issues and profits including those past due and unpaid and applv the same less
costs and expenses of operation and collection including reasonable attorney s fees upon any indebtedness
secured hereby and in such order as Beneficiary may determine
12
profits
damage
default

The entering upon and takin H possession of said propertv the collecton of such rents issues and
or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies or compensation or awards ft r in t iking or
of said property and the application or release thereof as aforesaid shall not cure or waive anv
or notice of default hereunder cr invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice

13 The fadure on the part of Beneficiarv to promptly enforce anv right hereunder shall not operate as
a waiver of such right and the waiver bv Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a w m c r cf anv other
or subsequent default
14 Time is of the essence hereof I pe n default bv Trustor in the pavment of anv indebtedness secured hire
by or in the performance of anv agreement hereunder all sums secure 1 herebv shall immodiitciv become clue
and pavable at the option of Beneficiarv In the event of such default Beneficiarv m n execute r e n\
irustee
to execute a written notice cf ele fault and of eie«_ ion o cause said pre pertv to be sc Id to s iti f i
cli m ns
hereof and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each eountv wherein said propertv er some part or
parcel thereof is situated Beneficiary also shall dei osit with Trustee the note and all documents ewdencing
expenditures secured hereby

on Trustor, shall sell sail property on the date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as
a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine Unit subject to any statutory right of Trustor to
direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall" tie sold), at public
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of
sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to
time until it shall be completed and, in every case, notice of postponement shail be given by public declaration
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the
same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. Tin? recitals in the
Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (I) the costs and
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's
fees; (2) cost of any evidence ot title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed;
(3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10'; per annum from date
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place.
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceeding all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be
fixed by the court.
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From
the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law.
18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees,
devisees, adminstrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and
several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural.
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public
record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless
brought by Trustee.
20.

This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah

21. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth.

(If Trustor an Individual)
STATE OF UTAH
ss

COUNTY OF
On the

*

./.

^
day of

"sy^fr^rf^r^:..

, A.IX 19/.^.., personally

appeared before m e ^ ^ ^ ^ , e ^
the signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that

xecu.t.ed the

!

^QjL<r.

Jy J Notary<...^^.^.,..,...:
Public residing at:ryr
/-^r"
/7
J/ / ^.-''•*/,

My Commission Expires:

__,
,
7'*v. i/<?fd
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF

Vj

>

:

'

£>?^^JL^..A^J^:u,-..
/
/
v>\... """'V
(If Trustor a Corporation)

''''

"•••?

^

'-

\

•''

S,;; -S ' * V

ss

*

On the

day of

appeared before me

, A.D. 19

, personally

, who being by me duly sworn,

says that he is the
of
,
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution
of its board of directors) and said
to me that said corporation executed the same.

acknowledged

Notary Public residing at:
My Commission Expires:

REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full)
TO:

TRUSTEE.

The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness secured
by the within Trust Deed. Said note, together with all other indebtedness secured by said Trust
Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby requested and directed, on payment
to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel said note above
mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed delivered to you
herewith, together with the said Trust Deed, and to reconvey, without warranty, to the parties
designated by the terms of said Trust Deed, all the estate now held by you thereunder.

Dated

, 19..

Mail reconveyance to

Q

«

w
w
Q
EH
CO

S

a

IS

1

Q

120
25008

BEGINNING 980 feet West of the Southeast Corner of the
Southwest 1/4 of Section 4, Township 17 South, Range 4
West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North 1320 feet;
thence West 1264 feet; thence South 625 feet; thence
Southeasterly along the roadway 541 feet; thence South
470 feet; thence East 840 feet to beginning. More or
less 35 Acres
BEGINNING 980 feet West of the Northeast Corner of the
Northwest 1/4 of Section 9, Township 17 South, Range 4
West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence South 1320 feet;
thence West 840 feet; thence North 1320 feet; thence East
840 feet to beginning. More or less 25 Acres.

EXHIBIT 'A'

